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Abstract  
 
In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the 
suppliers which would increase their joint surplus.  The provisions of such agreements depend on 
the buyer’s ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction.  When the buyer has no 
such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred 
supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers.  When the 
buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a 
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auction based on that cost. 
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1. Introduction   
 
We investigate bilateral negotiations and the resulting agreements between a buyer and 
one potential supplier in a competitive procurement setting with multiple suppliers.  In particular, 
we identify the existence of mutually beneficial agreements in which the buyer and one supplier 
affect the rules for future exchange.     
In their influential paper entitled "Auctions versus Negotiations", Bulow and Klemperer 
(1996) show that auctions dominate negotiations.1  This result appears to contradict the findings 
of Aghion and Bolton (1987) in which a buyer and a supplier can specify a mutually beneficial 
agreement that would allow them to extract surplus from future potential suppliers.  However, 
the apparent contradiction can be explained by the difference in the concept of negotiations 
employed in each paper.   In Bulow and Klemperer, the term negotiations refers to any trading 
mechanism designed by the buyer in order to maximize his surplus from awarding a contract to 
suppliers with private information.  In Aghion and Bolton, the term negotiations refers to a 
bilateral agreement between the buyer and one supplier in order to maximize their joint surplus.  
The agreement is reached at an ex ante stage prior to the realization of private information.  
In this paper, we follow Aghion and Bolton by examining agreements which maximize 
the joint surplus of the buyer and one supplier, called the preferred supplier.  As in Aghion and 
Bolton, these negotiations and the resulting agreement occur at the first stage, called stage 1, 
when there is no private information.  In particular, the preferred supplier does not know her cost 
at stage 1, and thus has no informational advantage over the buyer during the negotiations.  In 
the next stage, called stage 2, the preferred supplier and the other potential suppliers privately 
learn their costs.  In the final procurement stage, called stage 3, the buyer awards the contract to 
one of the suppliers.   
Under these assumptions, negotiations take place under symmetric information at stage 1, 
and therefore any agreement should be Pareto-efficient and individually-rational. Moreover, all 
Pareto-efficient agreements will result in the same trades at stage 3, and will only differ in the 
transfers between the buyer and the preferred supplier at stage 1. By assuming no budget or 
financial constraints, our model does not attempt to identify which of the possible transfers will 
take place.  
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We first examine agreements at stage 1 between the buyer and the preferred supplier in 
which the buyer grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal that can be exercised at 
stage 3.2  With a right-of-first-refusal, hereafter denoted ROFR, the preferred supplier has the 
option to be awarded the contract at a price equal to the lowest offer that the buyer obtains from 
the other competing suppliers.  
Bikhchandani, Lippman, and Ryan (2005) showed that a ROFR cannot increase the joint 
surplus of a buyer and a preferred supplier when the buyer uses a second-price auction. 
However, a second-price auction is not an appropriate model for a market when the buyer has no 
ability to design and commit to the rules of trade in stage 3.  This is the first case that we 
consider.  In particular, we examine markets in which the buyers do not have this ability.  The 
suppliers make price offers to the buyer who then simply decides which offer to accept.  If 
suppliers make (simultaneous) take-it-or-leave-it price offers to the buyer, such a market would 
be naturally characterized as a first-price auction.  For two suppliers, Choi (forthcoming) has 
shown that when suppliers make price bids (that is, when trade is governed by a first-price 
auction), the buyer and the preferred supplier can gain from a ROFR.  The analysis of Choi does 
not extend to more than two potential suppliers.  However, under some assumptions on the 
distribution of costs, we show in section 3 that Choi's findings can be generalized to any number 
of potential suppliers, and that a ROFR can increase the joint surplus of the buyer and one 
preferred supplier. 
A second-price auction is also not an appropriate model for a market where suppliers can 
improve their offers in response to the offers of other suppliers. Indeed, when no other remaining 
suppliers are willing to improve on the last offer by one supplier, that supplier may still make a 
final offer reducing his price in order to prevent the contract from being awarded to the preferred 
supplier who has a ROFR.3  Thus, such a market is better modeled as an oral auction where the 
"winner" is able to make a final offer to the buyer that improves on his last offer.  Using this 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 In the context of procurement, the authors have shown was that a simple auction would result in a lower expected 
price than an “an optimally-structured negotiation with one less bidder.” 
2 These preferential treatments are usually the product of agreements in the past, many times as by-product of other 
transactions. That is, they are the result of negotiations carried out at a time where the informational asymmetry with 
respect to the present transaction was less important. 
3 This is impossible under the rules of a second-price auction. Although this difference is irrelevant when no supplier 
has a ROFR, it happens to be crucial when there is a supplier with a ROFR. Thus, the results in Bikhchandani, 
Lippman, and Ryan (2005) hold when suppliers participate in a second-price auction, a designed mechanism when 
bidders do not make price offers, rather than a decentralized market where suppliers decide on the prices they offer. 
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modified oral auction, we show in section 3 that a ROFR increases the joint surplus of the buyer 
and the preferred supplier for any distribution of costs. 
The ROFR satisfies two natural constraints on the feasible agreements at stage 1 when the 
buyer does not have the ability to commit to the rules of trade in stage 3.  Given the price offers 
of competing suppliers at stage 3, a ROFR does not require the buyer to pay a price higher than 
the lowest price offer received from the suppliers. Also, the ROFR does not require the preferred 
supplier to accept the contract at a price below her cost. 4,5  In addition, the ROFR maximizes the 
ex post gains from trade in stage 3 between the buyer and the preferred supplier. Thus, the ROFR 
is a natural provision to consider for an agreement in stage 1 when the buyer does not have the 
ability to commit to the rules of trade in stage 3. However, more complex provisions for this 
agreement may arise when the buyer does have this ability. In section 4, we examine an optimal 
agreement when the buyer can commit to the rules of trade in stage 3.  
 In general, the mechanism that would maximize the buyer’s ex ante surplus would not specify 
trading rules that would maximize the ex post gains from trade in stage 3.  These optimal trading 
rules often create ex post inefficiencies in order to extract surplus from one or more suppliers.  
Without an agreement in stage 1, the optimal mechanism for the buyer would specify a standard 
auction with a reserve price below the buyer's value.  As such, the buyer creates a positive 
probability of refusing to award the contract even though some supplier would be willing to 
make a price offer below his value, though not below his reserve price.6  Standard auction theory 
implies that the mechanism which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the buyer and the 
preferred supplier would be a standard auction with an even lower reserve price that depends on 
the reported cost of the preferred supplier.  However, in order to implement this mechanism, the 
                                                 
4 Of course, one can envision an agreement in which the preferred supplier is required to supply the good for a set 
price at the option of the buyer.  Such an agreement could create a reserve price at the procurement stage below both 
the reservation value of the buyer and the cost of the preferred supplier. This is a trivial way of recreating 
commitment ability when we are trying to examine the ROFR in the absence of such ability.  
5 Our results on the ROFR can be extended very easily to show that granting the ROFR to one supplier increases the 
joint surplus of the buyer and the preferred supplier even when the buyer uses an optimal auction to maximize his 
surplus, such as when the buyer can set a binding reserve price. However, if the buyer can design the trading rules, 
that agreement does not maximize the joint surplus of the buyer and the preferred supplier. Arozamena and 
Weinschelbaum (2006) show that a ROFR cannot be part of the optimal mechanism for the buyer in this case.   
6 Hua (2007) considers this case reversing the role of buyers and sellers (a seller faces multiple buyers). He finds the 
optimal contract when the preferred buyer has limited funds at stage 1. When the preferred buyer has sufficient 
funds at stage 1, as in our case, that contract amounts to selling the object at stage 1 to the preferred buyer, who then 
can auction it to other buyers. Or, in our procurement setting, this agreement includes payments to the preferred 
supplier that depend on the cost of competing suppliers. This may be problematic if we are discussing agreements 
other than full vertical integration between the buyer and the preferred supplier. 
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buyer would need to learn the cost of the preferred supplier that is privately realized at stage 2. In 
section 4 we demonstrate that this mechanism can indeed be implemented by an agreement in 
stage 1 which incorporates a revelation game in stage 2.  
 
2. The procurement model 
 
We examine a three-stage procurement model with one buyer and multiple suppliers each 
having independent private costs.  The buyer has a value (v > 1) for a good or service having a 
fixed quantity and quality.  There are (n+1) suppliers, and each supplier obtains its cost of 
production ci as an independent realization of a random variable with the distribution function 
G(c) on the support [0,1].  For some specific results, we will also need additional assumptions on 
the cost distribution.  First, we may need to assume that the density function g(c) is continuously 
differentiable.  Second, we may need to assume that the inverse hazard rate function, defined as 
)(/)](1[ cgcG− , is monotonically decreasing in c.  Third, we may also need to assume that 
)(/)( cgcG  is increasing in c.  These assumptions on the cost distribution are common in 
procurement auction models.   
The procurement model has three stages.  At the beginning of stage 1, the value of the 
buyer v and the cost distribution G(c) of the suppliers are common knowledge.  During stage 1, 
the buyer can negotiate an agreement with one preferred supplier (PS) about the rules and 
payoffs for the future stages in the procurement process.  At the beginning of stage 2, each 
supplier realizes his cost of production ci , and the cost ci is private information to the ith 
supplier.   At the end of stage 3, the buyer awards the contract for the good to one of the 
suppliers and pays that supplier.  
In section 3, we examine two auction models for stage 3, a standard first-price auction 
and a modified open auction.  With the first-price auction, suppliers can make simultaneous price 
offers to the buyer at stage 3.  If there is no agreement at stage 1, then the buyer accepts the 
lowest offer.  We assume that the accepted lowest offer can be verified.  However, if there is an 
agreement at stage 1 to grant a ROFR, the PS has the right to accept the contract at the lowest 
price offer from the other suppliers.  If the PS chooses not to accept the contract at that price, the 
buyer awards the contract to the supplier with the lowest offer.  We assume that the presence of 
the PS with the ROFR is common knowledge. 
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In section 3, we also examine a modified open auction, modeled as a clock auction, in 
which suppliers make sequentially lower price offers at stage 3 until all but one supplier drops 
out. At that point, the remaining supplier can make a final reduction in his price offer. If there is 
no agreement at stage 1, this supplier obtains the contract at that price.  If there is an agreement 
at stage 1, the PS can again exercise the ROFR to accept the contract at that same price. 
In section 4, we examine the case in which the buyer can design the trading mechanism 
used at stage 3. If there is no agreement at stage 1, the buyer designs the mechanism that 
maximizes his surplus. If there are negotiations at stage 1, the agreement between the buyer and 
the PS can set the trading rules in stage 3.  
For the models in both sections 3 and 4, the buyer and the PS have symmetric 
information at stage 1.  Thus, any agreement between them would result in an ex ante Pareto-
efficient outcome, that is, one that maximizes their expected joint surplus.  The resulting division 
of this joint surplus between the buyer and the PS would be implemented by transfers between 
the buyer and the PS at stage 1.  These transfers do not affect the allocation of the contract. 
 
3. Agreement with a right-of-first-refusal 
 
 In this section, we examine potential agreements between the buyer and a PS in which the 
buyer grants a ROFR to the PS.  First, we consider the case of a first-price auction in stage 3. 
Without an agreement at stage 1, we define the outcome of that first-price auction.7  All (n+1) 
suppliers make simultaneous price offers, and the buyer awards the contract to the supplier with 
the lowest offer at a price equal to that offer.  The expected profit of a supplier after its cost is 
known at stage 2 can be expressed as 
(1)  [ ]∫ −= 1   )(1 )( c dzzG  cΠ n  . 
The resulting expected profits of a supplier at stage 1 are 
(2)  [ ]∫ −⋅= 1   0 )(1)(   dccGcGEΠ n . 
With symmetric suppliers, the expected price paid by the buyer with this first-price auction is   
(3)  [ ]  )(1)()()1( 1 
0 
1    dccGcGcgnncEP nFPA ∫ −−⋅⋅⋅⋅+⋅= . 
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Now assume that the buyer and the PS negotiate an agreement that grants a ROFR to the 
PS, perhaps in exchange for some transfer by the PS to the buyer during stage 1.  We use the 
term preference auction (PA) to define the first-price auction in which one supplier has a ROFR, 
and denote the other n suppliers as the competing suppliers (CS).  After receiving the price offers 
from the CS, the buyer then offers the contract to the PS at the lowest price offered by the CS.  
The PS will accept contract if her cost is below the lowest offer of the CS, and will reject it 
otherwise.8  If the contract is rejected by the PS, the buyer then awards the contract to the CS 
with the lowest offer at a price equal to that offer. 
We will subscript variables related to the preferred supplier (PS) by p and those related to 
the competing suppliers (CS) by k.  We now characterize a symmetric, monotone equilibrium 
bidding function for the CS, )(cb .  This equilibrium bidding function must satisfy:  
(4)  [ ] [ ] [ ] . )(1 ))((1))(( maxarg    );(maxarg 1 −−⋅−⋅−== nzGzbGczbzczbΠzc k  
In order for a particular CS to win the contract, its bid b(z) must be below the cost of the PS and 
its “pretended” cost z must be below the costs of each of the other (n–1) CS.  When n = 1, the 
maximization problem in (4) is dominance solvable.  However when n > 1, the first-order 
condition for this problem is the following differential equation, 9  
(5)  ,
]})([)({)(
])([)1()( (c)' 
ccbbHcH
ccbnbHb −−⋅
−⋅−⋅=    
where H represents the inverse hazard rate )(/)](1[)( xgxGxH −= .  Together with the condition 
1)1( =b , the differential equation (5) is an initial value problem whose solution defines the 
equilibrium, symmetric bidding function b(c) for CS when n > 1.10 Although standard existence 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The derivation of these results is standard. See Myerson (1981). 
8 The PS has no incentive to make an offer because any offer below all the offers of the CS would only lower the 
price at which the PS would be awarded the contract. See Burguet and Perry (2007) for an alternative model of 
favoritism. 
9 Monotonicity and symmetry of the bounded bidding function imply that it is differentiable almost everywhere. 
10  The second-order conditions are satisfied as long as b(c) > c at the solution to the differential equation (5), and 
then b'(c) > 0.  Indeed, the first-order condition defines an identity in c,
[ ]
0 
);( =
=∂
∂
czz
czbkΠ , so that 
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and uniqueness results do not apply, we can still prove the existence and uniqueness of this 
bidding function under certain assumptions on the cost distribution G(c). 
 
Proposition 1:  If the density function g(c) is continuously differentiable, then there exists a 
unique strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function b(c) for the competing suppliers in a 
preference auction defined by (5) and b(1) = 1.  
  
The proof of Proposition 1 contained in the Appendix. We can now calculate the 
expected profits of the suppliers and the expected price for the buyer at stage 1.  In order to do 
so, we first calculate the expected profit function of both the PS and the CS in stage 2 after they 
have realized their cost c.  In a monotone equilibrium, incentive compatibility requires that the 
derivative of the expected profit function of a CS is 1 )](1[))]((1[ /)( −−⋅−−=∂∂ ncGcbGccΠk .  
By integrating this expression, we obtain the expected profit function of a CS with cost c : 
(6)  .)](1[]))((1[ )(
1 
 
1     dzzGzbG    cΠ
c
n
k ∫ −−⋅−=  
Similarly, we obtain the expected profit function of the PS with cost c : 
(7)  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
<<−
≤−+−
=
∫
∫
−
−
1 )0( if                           ]))((1[ 
)0( if     ))]((1[  ])0([
 )(
1 
 
1 
)0(
 1
 
 1
cbdzzbG
bc dzzbG cb
  cΠ
c
b
n
n
p .    
From these expressions, we can calculate the expected profits of each type of supplier over the 
distribution of costs: 
(8)  ∫ −−⋅−⋅= 1 0 1   )](1[))]((1[)( dccGcbGcG EΠ nk ,  
(9)  ∫∫ +−⋅= − (0) 0 (0)  )(  ))]((1[)(1   1 bb dccG  dccbGcG  EΠ np . 
                                                                                                                                                             [ ] [ ] [ ]
0 
);(
 
);(
 
);( =
=∂
∂
∂
∂+
=∂
∂
∂
∂=
=∂
∂
czz
czbkΠ
cczz
czbkΠ
zczz
czbkΠ
dc
d
.  Thus the second-order condition is 
simply 
[ ] [ ][ ]
0
)(1 ))((1
 
);( 1 ≥−−−=
=∂
∂
∂
∂ −
dc
cGcbGd
czz
czbkΠ
c
n
. 
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Expressions (8) and (9) are the expected profits for each type of supplier at the end of the stage 1, 
after the buyer and the PS have negotiated the agreement for a ROFR, but before any supplier 
has realized its cost in stage 2.  From (2), (8), and (9), it follows immediately that  
(10)  kp EΠEΠEΠ >> .   
Relative to a first-price auction without preference for any supplier, the PS benefits from the 
ROFR in the preference auction, while each CS is harmed.  Finally, the expected price for the 
buyer in stage 1 from the preference auction in stage 3 is the expected value of the lowest price 
offered by the CS: 
(11)   dccGcgncb  EP nPA ∫ −−⋅⋅⋅= 1 0 1   )](1[)()( . 
We now compare the joint surplus of the buyer and the PS with and without the ROFR.  
Since the probability that the buyer will award the contract to one of the suppliers is the same 
with or without preference, we need only examine the difference between the ex ante expected 
profits of the PS in stage 1 and the ex ante expected prices for the buyer in stage 1.  We compare 
this difference with and without the ROFR.  Under certain assumptions on inverse hazard rate 
function, the ROFR will indeed increase the expected joint surplus of the buyer and the PS.  
 
Proposition 2: If the inverse hazard rate function )(/)](1[ cgcG−  is decreasing and convex, then 
the expected joint surplus of the buyer and the preferred supplier is higher when the buyer grants 
a right-of-first-refusal to the preferred supplier. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  The difference between the joint surplus with and without preference is 
)]([)] ( [ FPAPAp EPvEΠEPvEΠ −+−−+ .  Rearranging this difference in terms of the profits 
and prices yields  ][][ EΠEΠEPEP pPAFPA −+− .  Denote )(cbFPA  as the bidding function in a 
first-price auction with (n+1) symmetric suppliers. The expected price in this first-price auction 
without preference can be decomposed as follows: 
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[ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] .)(1)()(                      
)(1)()()(     )(1)()(            
)(1)()1()( 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
 
1 1 
1  
∫
∫∫
∫
−⋅⋅+
−⋅⋅⋅⋅−−⋅⋅⋅=
−⋅⋅+⋅=
−−
dccGcgcb
dccGcGcgncbdccGcgncb
dccGcgncbEP
n
nn
n
FPA
FPAFPA
FPAFPA
 
The expected profits in the preference auction can be expressed directly in terms of the bidding 
function, and then can be bounded from below as follows: 
( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] .  )(1)(      )()(1)()(          
 )(1)(     )()(1)()(           
)(  )(1)()(           
)(   )(1)()( 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
1 
}0)(1max{ 
  1   
  1   
1   
1   
∫∫
∫∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
−⋅⋅−⋅−⋅⋅⋅=
−⋅⋅−⋅−⋅⋅⋅=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅⋅−>
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅⋅−=
−
−
−
−
−
dccGcgcdccGcGcgncb
dccGcgcdccgdxxGxgnxb
dccgdxxGxgncxb
dccgdxxGxgncxbEΠ
nn
nn
n
n
c
c
,cbp
 
The inequality in the second line arises from the fact that } 0  )( max{ 1 ,cbc −> , and the equality 
in the last line is obtained by changing the order of integration.  After substituting these two 
expressions, and the expression for the EPPA from (11), into the difference in joint surplus, and 
rearranging terms, we find that 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] .  )(1)(])([                                             
 )(1)()(])()([                             
)(1)(])()([    ][][ 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
1   
1   
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⋅⋅−+
−⋅⋅⋅⋅−−
−⋅⋅⋅−>−+−
∫
∫
∫
−
−
EΠdccGcgccb
dccGcGcgncbcb
dccGcgncbcb EΠEΠEPEP
n
n
FPA
n
FPA
FPA
pPAFPA
 
The third term on the right-hand side is zero because the integral is the definition of the expected 
profits EΠ of a supplier in the auction without preference.  Combining the first two terms, we 
obtain the following lower bound on the difference in the joint surplus: 
(12) [ ]   )(1)(])()([     ][][ 1  
0 ∫ −⋅⋅⋅−>−+− dccGcgncbcbEΠEΠEPEP nFPApPAFPA . 
Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004) and Porter and Shoham (2005) have examined the 
bidding behavior of n symmetric suppliers in a first-price auction when another supplier has a 
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ROFR. Both papers demonstrate that )]()([ cbcbFPA −  is positive for all c if the inverse hazard 
rate function of the cost distribution )(/)](1[ cgcG−  is decreasing and convex.  QED 
 
 Proposition 2 provides insight into how the ROFR extracts rents from the CS.  If the 
inverse hazard rate function is decreasing and convex, then the CS make more aggressive price 
offers after the ROFR is granted to one supplier.  Expected total surplus of the buyer and all the 
suppliers is reduced because the ex post allocation in the preference auction will be inefficient 
for certain cost realizations.  In particular, an inefficient allocation occurs when the cost of the 
PS is below the lowest offer of the CS, but above the cost of the CS with the lowest offer.  
However, Proposition 2 demonstrates that the expected value of this inefficiency is smaller than 
the reduction in expected surplus of the CS.  As a result, the expected joint surplus of the buyer 
and the PS increases with an agreement in stage 1 whereby the buyer grants a ROFR to the PS. 
This generalizes the results in Choi (forthcoming) for any number of CS. 
Proposition 2 also demonstrates that the findings of Bikhchandani, Lippman, and Ryan 
(2005) are unique to a second-price auction among the CS.  Once the ROFR is granted to one 
supplier, a second-price auction among the CS is no longer equivalent to a first-price preference 
auction among the CS.  With a second-price auction, the dominant strategy for a supplier is to 
make a price offer equal to his cost with or without preference.  As such, the CS would not bid 
more or less aggressively in the presence of a PS.  This is not true in the case of a first-price 
auction.  Depending on the properties of the inverse hazard rate function, the CS may bid more 
or less aggressively in the presence of a PS.   
Now, assume that the buyer can "shop" for lower prices. Absent agreements at stage 1, 
the market is best described as an oral auction. We examine a modified open auction which takes 
the form of a clock auction,11 with a final offer by the winner. The clock points to progressively 
lower prices until all but one supplier drop out of the auction. At this moment, the one supplier 
that has not dropped out can make this price his final offer, or can make an even lower offer. 
Without an agreement between the buyer and the PS, the winner never has an incentive to make 
a lower final offer. Thus, this auction is equivalent to a standard clock auction, and has a simple 
(perfect-Bayesian) equilibrium where all suppliers drop out at their cost, and the winner makes 
the price on the clock his final offer. Thus, without an agreement at stage 1, equations (2) and (3) 
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still describe the payoffs of all agents. If there is an agreement, Proposition 3 describes an 
equilibrium at stage 3. 
 
Proposition 3: In the modified open auction where the preferred supplier has a right-of-
first-refusal the following describes the equilibrium strategy for each competing supplier with 
cost ic : i) if not all other competing suppliers have dropped out, drop out at a price equal to ic ; 
ii) if all other competing suppliers have dropped out, and the last of them dropped out at price p, 
then make a final offer equal to min{p,p'( ic )}, where p'( ic ) is the solution to  
(13)  icg(p')
G(p')p' =−− 1 . 
For the preferred supplier, her equilibrium strategy is to accept the contract if this final offer is 
below her cost.  
 
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward, and we omit it. As in a second-price 
auction, the equilibrium price will coincide with the second lowest cost realization of the CS 
when this second lowest cost is close to the lowest cost realization of the CS. However, if the 
lowest cost is sufficiently below the second lowest cost, then the equilibrium price defined by 
(13) will be lower than it would in a second-price auction. This observation is almost all that is 
necessary to conclude that a ROFR results in higher expected joint surplus for the buyer and the 
PS. 
 
Proposition 4: The expected joint surplus of the buyer and the preferred supplier is 
higher when the buyer grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let 1c  and 2c  represent the lowest and second lowest cost 
realization of CS, respectively. Also, let p'( 1c ) be the solution of (13) at 1c .  If  p'( 1c ) > 2c , then 
the price will be 2c  with or without a ROFR. The profit of the PS will also be the same and there 
could be no difference in the joint surplus. Now, suppose that p'( 1c ) < 2c . If so, the price p'( 1c ) 
with the ROFR will be less than the price 2c  without the ROFR. Now consider the joint surplus 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See, Cramton (1998) for a description of this model. 
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of the buyer and the PS when cp is the cost of the PS. If  cp < p'( 1c ), then the contract is awarded 
to the PS with or without the ROFR. Thus, again there would be no difference in the joint 
surplus, pcv − .  If  cp > p'( 1c ), then the contract is awarded to the lowest cost CS at a price 
p'( 1c ) with the ROFR. The resulting joint surplus will be )(' 1cpv − . Without the ROFR, the joint 
surplus will be 2cv −  when pcc ≤2 , and pcv −  when pcc >2 . Since },min{)(' 21 pcccp < , the 
joint surplus with the ROFR is greater than the joint surplus without the ROFR.  QED 
 
One might ask whether there could be another agreement that would result in even higher 
joint surplus.  For the moment assume that CS must make their price offers, final or not, before 
the agreement in stage 1 is implemented, and that the buyer and the PS take these offers as given, 
independent of their agreement.  Under these conditions, ex ante maximization of joint surplus is 
equivalent to ex post maximization of the gains from trade, and a ROFR accomplishes both. 
Although the ROFR requires that the lowest price offer from CS is verifiable,12 the ROFR is 
immune to problems associated with asymmetric information between the buyer and the PS on 
the cost of the PS.  
Thus, the answer to this question depends on whether an agreement at stage 1 can 
influence the price offers by the CS.  Whatever the agreement states, that will not occur if the 
buyer trades with CS if and only if their lowest offer is below the cost of the PS. Indeed, the CS 
will solve the same problem whose solution is characterized in Proposition 1 or Proposition 3.  
We are assuming that the buyer cannot commit to trade at a price above the lowest price offer he 
receives and that the PS cannot commit to trade at a price below her cost, Thus, the only 
remaining possibility is that, as a consequence of the agreement at stage 1, there is a positive 
probability that the buyer trades with a CS at a price above the cost of the PS.  Although it seems 
counterintuitive that more aggressive price offers by the CS could be induced (and so more 
surplus could be extracted from CS) by increasing the probability that they obtain the contract 
for a given price, in fact we cannot rule out this possibility in general.  Thus, in principle, a 
ROFR may not be a provision of the optimal agreement when the buyer cannot commit to the 
rules of trade. However, it also seems theoretically challenging, at best, and certainly beyond the 
                                                 
12 Verifiability of this offer (the realized price, if trade takes place with a CS) is a relatively weak condition because 
the ROFR requires that such price be communicated to the PS. 
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goals of this paper, to characterize the set of implementable allocations that also satisfy the 
notion of "inability to commit" on the part of the buyer. 
 
4. Mechanism design and bilateral negotiations.  
 
In this section, we examine agreements in stage 1 when the buyer has the ability to 
commit to the rules of trade to be used in stage 3. In particular, we characterize the optimal 
agreement between the buyer and the PS under this assumption.  
Let cp denote the cost realization of the PS in stage 2.  The buyer and the PS could 
guarantee themselves a minimum joint surplus of (v − cp) at stage 2 by simply awarding the 
contract to the PS.  Thus, if there were no informational asymmetries at stage 2, the cost cp of the 
PS becomes the joint willingness to pay by the buyer and PS for awarding the contract to one of 
the CS.  Standard auction theory would then apply to this case.  For an agent whose willingness 
to pay is x, the optimal mechanism is a standard auction with reserve price )(xr  defined by:  
(15)  xrg
rGr     )(
)(    =+ . 
Thus, the mechanism that maximizes the expected joint surplus would be a standard auction with 
a reserve price )( pcr . Given our assumption on the distribution function that G(c)/g(c) is 
increasing in c, the left-hand side of (15) is clearly increasing in r.  Thus, )( pcr  is an increasing 
function of the cost of the PS. 
 This first-price auction with an optimal reserve price defined by (15) is not a feasible 
(implementable) agreement at stage 1.  Unlike the previous agreement in which the buyer 
granted a ROFR to the PS, an agreement to implement this auction requires that the buyer learn 
the cost of the PS before the procurement stage 3.  Thus, the agreement must account for the 
incentives of the PS to reveal her cost to the buyer in stage 2.  The question is whether an 
agreement between the buyer and the PS can be designed in stage 1 so that the PS has an 
incentive to reveal her cost at stage 2.  Proposition 5 provides an affirmative answer to this 
question. 
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Proposition 5: The following agreement between the buyer and the preferred supplier 
maximizes their expected joint surplus.  At stage 2, the preferred supplier reports her cost pc to 
the buyer in exchange for a payment from the buyer equal to [ ]∫ −1   ))((1
p
c
dxxrG n , where r(x) is 
defined by (15).  At stage 3, the buyer then holds a first-price auction among the competing 
suppliers with a optimal reserve price )( pcr .  If none of the competing suppliers submits a bid 
below )( pcr , the buyer awards the contract to the preferred supplier at a price equal to pc . 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  We need to show that the payment from the buyer provides the PS with 
an incentive to reveal her true cost pc  at stage 2.  Consider the revelation problem facing the PS 
when deciding on her cost report to the buyer: 
(16)  [ ] [ ] nn zrGczdxxrG pz z   ))((1)(    ))((1 max 1  −⋅−+−∫ . 
The first term is the payment for the cost report z.  The second term is the expected profit (or 
loss) from a cost report z above (or below) the actual cost of the PS, equal to the margin times 
the probability of being awarded the contract at price z.  The first-order condition for this 
problem is 
(17)  [ ] 0    )('))(())((1)(  1 =⋅⋅−⋅⋅−− − zrzrgzrGncz np  . 
This condition is satisfied at pcz = .  Using the same argument as footnote 15, the second-order 
condition is also satisfied at pcz = .  In particular, the derivative of the left-hand side of (17) 
with respect to z equals the negative of its derivative with respect to pc ,  
[ ] , 0)('))(())((1 1 <⋅⋅−⋅− − zrzrgzrGn n   which is negative.  QED 
 
In the absence of an agreement at stage 1, the buyer's optimal mechanism at stage 2 is a 
first-price auction with a reserve price r(v). The mechanism of Proposition 5 induces higher 
expected joint surplus for the buyer and the PS. With respect to efficiency, the results are 
ambiguous. In a first-price auction with reserve price r(v) and no ROFR, the allocation is 
efficient provided that trade occurs. This is not necessarily so with the mechanism of Proposition 
5. Thus, for examples where r(v) = 1, the mechanism is less efficient than the auction. However, 
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trade always occurs in the mechanism of Proposition 5, and this implies a gain in efficiency with 
respect to any auction where r(v) < 1. Thus, contrary to the cases analyzed in section 3, when the 
buyer can commit to the trading rules, the agreement between the buyer and the PS has an 
ambiguous effect on efficiency.  
As an illustration, assume that costs are distributed uniformly and that there are only two 
suppliers, n = 1.  If v = 2, we find that r(v) = 1, and pp ccr 2/1)( = .  In this case the expected 
total surplus is larger with the auction than with the mechanism of Proposition 5.  However, 
when v = 1, we find that r(v) = 1/2 and )( pcr  is unchanged.  In this case, the expected total 
surplus generated by the auction with the reserve price r(v) is 7/12, whereas the expected total 
surplus under the mechanism of Proposition 5 is 9/12.  Thus, an agreement at stage 1 results in 
more efficient trade, i.e., increases the expected total surplus. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
There are two extreme cases which this paper does not (and cannot) address. The first 
case occurs when bilateral negotiations cannot be conducted prior to the realization of the costs. 
This would prohibit lump sum transfers (i.e., independent of the cost realizations) between the 
buyer and the preferred supplier. In other words, the (interim) individual rationality constraint for 
the preferred supplier would have to be satisfied for each cost realization. Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983) showed that the buyer and the seller could not realize the joint surplus that 
is attained with the mechanism of Proposition 5 (i.e., could not realize Pareto-optimal 
negotiations). Moreover, it is a relatively straightforward corollary of the analysis in Myerson 
(1981) that no bilateral negotiation could simultaneously allow the buyer and a PS to realize an 
expected joint surplus above what could be obtained from an auction with reserve price 
independent of the cost of the preferred supplier while inducing the supplier to reveal his cost, 
and allowing the buyer to appropriate a share of the joint surplus greater than what he could 
obtain alone using an auction with an appropriate reserve price.  
The second case occurs when all parties can participate in the ex ante negotiations 
without restriction. In this case an auction (with a reserve price v, i.e., no effective reserve price) 
clearly maximizes expected total surplus. However, even if all-inclusive negotiations are 
feasible, the possible outcomes of bilateral negotiations may be relevant for defining the threat 
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points. Consider the case in which a buyer negotiates ex ante with two potential suppliers.  For 
example, Burguet, Caminal, and Matutes (2002) have a model of three party negotiations in this 
setting.  If one of the two suppliers departed the negotiations, the mechanism in Proposition 5 
defines the fall-back option of the other two parties when they can design the trading mechanism. 
That is, the mechanism determines the highest expected joint surplus that they can guarantee 
themselves knowing that in the future they could contact the other supplier for trading. 
Moreover, the grant of a ROFR would determine the fall-back option when it is the departing 
supplier who would have the ability to set the terms of trade in this future potential contact. 
The usual justification for bilateral negotiations, instead of all-inclusive negotiations, is 
that the mere existence or availability of these other competing suppliers is a random event.  In 
other words, exogenous entry is possible in the future (altering our stage 1), but is not a certain 
event. See Aghion and Bolton (1987) or Hua (2007). It is a straightforward exercise to extend the 
analysis in this paper to such case.  
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Appendix:  Proof of Proposition 1 
 
We need only prove that the initial value problem in (5) with b(1) = 1 has a unique, strictly 
monotone solution whenever g(c) is continuously differentiable.  Write the initial value problem 
(5) as 1)1(  ,  ),(' == bcbb φ  , where 
]}[)({)(
][)1()(),(
cbbHcH
cbnbHcb −−⋅
−⋅−⋅=φ  
We cannot readily apply standard existence results to this initial value problem because 0)1( =H  
and then ),( cbφ  is not well-defined around (1,1).  The problem occurs in the denominator of 
),( cbφ .  Let us define )(cB  as the inverse function of )()(1 xHxcB −=− .  Note that the 
denominator in the definition of ),( cbφ  is 0 at any point ))(,( cBc .  At any point ),( bc  with 
)(cBb < , the denominator is positive and ),( cbφ  is well-defined.  Also note that )(cB  is an 
increasing and continuous function and that 1)1( =B .  Finally, note that )(' cB  is bounded above 
by 1.  Indeed, 
1)('1)(
1
>−=
−
xH
dx
xdB . 
Instead of considering our original initial value problem, consider the following sequence of 
initial value problems.  Let }{ mc  be an increasing sequence of numbers that converge to 1.  
Define the initial value problem 
mmmmm ccbcbb == )(ˆ  ,  ),ˆ('ˆ φ  . 
The function ),( cbφ  and also bcb ∂∂ /),(φ  are continuous for )1,0[∈c  and [ ))(,0 cBb∈  if g(c) is 
positive and continuously differentiable.  Thus, there exists a unique solution )(ˆ cbm  to that 
initial value problem in some interval ],( mm cTc − , for some positive number T .  We note that 
the solution [ ))(,)(ˆ cBccbm ∈ .  Indeed, )(' cB  is bounded above by 1, but ∞→),( cbφ  as  
)(cBb→ .  This shows that indeed )()(ˆ cBcbm < .  We conclude that the unique solution )(ˆ cbm  
exists in ],0[ mc .  Then define the monotone continuous function in the interval [0,1]: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
≥
<=
m
mm
m ccc
cccbcb
 if          
 if   )(ˆ)(  . 
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Lemma 1:  The sequence )(cbm  is non-decreasing in m for all ]1,0[∈c .  Also [ ))(,)( cBccbm ∈ . 
Proof:  Consider the functions  mb  and 1+mb .  At the point 1+mc , 1)(' 1 =+mm cb , whereas the left 
derivative of )( 11 ++ mm cb  is zero.  Thus, in an open interval to the left of 1+mc , ).()(1 cbcb mm >+   
We show next that the continuous functions )(1 cbm+  and )(cbm  do not cross.  Assume that for 
some 1+< mcc , )()(1 cbcb mm =+ .  If mcc > , then again 1)(' =cbm  and 0)('1 =+ cbm .  The latter 
follows from the fact that ccbm =)(  in this interval, and then if ccbcb mm ==+ )()(1 , the 
numerator in the definition of ),( cbφ  is zero.  Now, if mcc ≤ , then )'()'(1 cbcb mm =+  for all 
cc <' .  Indeed, both mb  and 1+mb  would be the solution to the same new initial value problem 
defined by (5) with )()'( cbcb m=  for  cc =' .  Thus, we conclude that the functions do not cross, 
and that indeed  )()(1 cbcb mm ≥+  for all c. 
To prove the second part of the lemma, we first show that mb  does not cross the function c.  In 
the interval ]1,[ mc  , the two functions coincide.  As we have shown above, the left derivative of 
mb  at mc  is zero, and then mb  is above c at the left of mc .  If at some mcc < , ccbm =)( , then 
once again the derivative of mb  at c is zero, and the derivative of c is one.  Thus, we conclude 
that mb  does not cross c.  QED 
 
A consequence of the first part of Lemma 1 is that 0)()( 1 →− − cbcb mm  for all ]1,0[∈c .  Let 
)( lim)( cbcb mm ∞→= .  By the second part of Lemma 1, ccbccbH mm ≥>+ )())(( , so that 
0)(' >cbm .  Pointwise convergence implies that )(cb  is monotone, but does not guarantee the 
continuity of )(cb .  The next lemma shows that )(cb  is indeed continuous. 
 
Lemma 2:  )(cb  is continuous.  That is, mb  converges uniformly on [0,1]. 
Proof:  Assume that )(cb  is discontinuous at a point 1'<c .  Let )( lim  ' cbb cc↑− =  and 
)( lim  ' cbb cc↓+ = .  Also, let 0 >=− −+ αbb .  Since )()( cbcbm →  and  )(cbm  is a non-
decreasing sequence of continuous monotone functions, then m   ,0, 11 ∃>∀ δε  such that 
111 )()( εαδδ −>−−+ cbcb mm , in which case )','( 11 δδ +−∈∃ ccc  such that 
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11 2/)()),(()(' δεαφ −≥= ccbcb mm .  For 1δ  small enough (consider only 1δ  smaller than 
3/)'1( c− ), the right-hand side is a as large as desired.  That is, m   ,0, 11 ∃>∀ δε , 
)','( 11 δδ +−∈ ccc  such that )),(( ccbmφ  is as large as desired.  Or equivalently, )(cbm  is as close 
to )(cB  as desired and )])(())(([ ccbcbH mm −−  is as close to zero as desired.  That shows that, 
1,,   ,0 δε cm∃>∀  such that  
εφ ⋅
⋅−>
)(
))(()1()),((
cH
cbHnccb mm , 
and also )()( cbcB m−>ε .  
Let 3/)'1(2 c−=δ .  Since )(cH  is non-increasing, the above inequality implies 
 )(
)'(
))'(()1()),(( 21 εε
δδφ ∆≡⋅
++⋅−>
cH
cbHnccb mm  . 
For ε  small enough, that expression is larger than one, and thus larger than )(' cB .  (Recall that 
)(' cB is bounded above by one.)  In other words, for values cc >'' , )()( cbcB m−  does not 
become larger.  Thus, we can conclude that the inequality above holds for any ''c  in the interval 
)',( 21 δδ ++cc .  Take ε  so that 22 2)( δεδε +>⋅∆ , and since 12 δδ > , )()( cbcB m−>ε . and 
1)'(' <cB , we conclude that )()( cBcbm > .  This contradicts Lemma 1 and then shows that 
indeed )( cb  is continuous at 1 <c .  For 1 =c , continuity is a straightforward consequence of 
our construction of the sequence of functions )( cbm .  QED 
 
We can now show that the limit, )( cb , is a solution to the initial value problem (5) and is strictly 
monotone.  To that end, we first show that ' mb  converges uniformly in [0,1). 
 
Lemma 3: 'mb  converges uniformly in [0,1). 
 
Proof: First notice that 'mb  is well defined except at mc . Now, for any point c in [0,1), let M be 
such that Mcc < . For all m > M, )),(()(' ccbcb mm φ= . According to Lemma 1, )(cbm  is non-
decreasing in m, ccbm ≥)( , and also we have that ),( cbφ  is monotone increasing in cb ≥ . 
Thus, )(' cbm  is increasing in m and bounded above by )),(( ccbφ . From Lemma 1, we also know 
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that )()( cBcb ≤ , but we have to show that )()( cBcb <  in order to guarantee that )),(( ccbφ (the 
upper bound) is finite. To this end, note that if )()( cBcb =  then for m large enough 
)),(()(' ccbcb mm φ=  is arbitrarily large and at the same time )(cbm  arbitrarily close to B(c). 
Since B'(c)  is bounded above by 1, we would have that for some m, mb  would cross B, which 
would contradict Lemma 1.  
Thus, we can guarantee that )(' cbm  converges. Let )(' cb  denote that limit, and assume that it is 
not continuous. That is, for some c, say ac −= 1 , for some ]1,0(∈a , there exists ε  such that  
.)(')'(''..', ε>−δ<−∃δ∀ cbcbandcctsc  
Then, fix a<δ  so that  
i) 5/)),(()"),"((,".." ε<φ−φδ<−∀ ccbccbcctsc  
and consider the corresponding c'. We know that δ  exists since φ  is continuous (and so 
uniformly continuous) in ]1,0[ a− . Next, fix M such that for all m>M, 
ii) ,5/)(')(' ε<− cbcbm  
iii) ,5/)'(')'(' ε<− cbcbm  
iv) .5/)"),"(()"),"((," ε<φ−φ∀ ccbccbc m  
We know that M exists since 'mb  converges point-wise to b' -(ii) and (iii)-, mb  converges 
uniformly to b, and again φ  is uniformly continuous -(iv)-. Now, 
,)(')'(')(')'(')'(')'(')(')'(' cbcbcbcbcbcbcbcb mmmm −+−+−≤−  
And 
.)),(()'),'(()),(()),(()'),'(()'),'((
)),(()'),'(()(')'('
ccbccbccbccbccbccb
ccbccbcbcb
mm
mmmm
φ−φ+φ−φ+φ−φ
≤φ−φ=−
 
Thus, from (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), we conclude that ε<− )(')'(' cbcb , adn this contradiction 
proves that )(' cb  is continuous. That proves the lemma.  QED 
We are now ready to show that b(c) is a solution to (5). First, note that 1)1( =mb  for all m, so 
that indeed the initial condition is satisfied, 1)1( =b . Now, take a sequence of initial values 
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problems defined by (5) and the initial condition mmm ccb =)( . Note that b(c) is the solution to 
each of these initial value problems in the corresponding intervals ],0[ mc . Indeed, 
),),(()),((lim
)()(
limlim
)()(
limlim)()(lim
0
00
ccbccb
cbcb
cbcbcbcb
mm
mm
m
mm
m
φ=φ=ε
ε−−
=ε
ε−−=ε
ε−−
∞→→ε∞→
∞→→ε→ε
 
Where the second equality follows from uniform convergence of )(' cbm  and the fourth from the 
fact that )),(( ccbφ  is continuous in the interval ],0[ mc .  
Now, }1,1{)}(,{ →mm cbc , and thus b(c) is indeed the solution to our initial value problem. 
Second, we need to show that b(c) is strictly monotone. Assume this is not true, so that at some 
point c < 1 we have that b'(c) = 0. That can only happen when b(c) = c, in which case the 
function b(c) would cross the 45º line at c, so that for some c' > c, b(c') < c'. This contradicts 
Lemma 1. Thus, b(c) is strictly monotone.  QED 
 
